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The EU is set to adopt a new Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy at 
a summit in June. This is strategically important for it and for its 
eastern neighborhood, where other powers like Russia and China 
pursue competing interests. As the policymaking process stands 
and given the tight deadline, however, the EU will only update and 
not upgrade the EaP framework due to EU states’ diverging inter-
ests. Brussels and Berlin will need to keep the EaP on the agenda 
after the summit to safeguard the EU’s transformative power in 
the region.
 – The EU should further differentiate its approach to EaP countries  
‘most willing’ to have closer ties with it (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) 
by deepening sectoral cooperation and allowing them to gradu-
ally integrate into the Single Market. 
 – The EU needs a smart, enhanced approach to security cooper-
ation to strengthen the EaP states’ capacity to counter hybrid 
threats. Deeper security and defense cooperation could be  
pursued bilaterally or by groups of willing member states.
 – The tight process of drafting the new policy should not be an 
obstacle for the European Commission to propose a long-term part-
nership approach that helps EaP countries sustainably withstand the 
main economic, political, and security challenges they face. 
 – The new EaP policy has to represent a credible commitment. 
Germany should keep the EaP on the agenda in its EU presidency 
in the second half of 2020 to bring more substance to the frame-
work that will be adopted in June.
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Introduction
In line with the European Council’s decision of June 
2019,1 European Commission President Ursula von 
der Leyen has instructed Commissioner for Neigh-
borhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi to design 
a new set of long-term policy objectives for the six 
countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP): Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.2 
The new policy will be endorsed on June 18, 2020 at 
the long-overdue EaP summit in Brussels. While the 
20 Deliverables for 2020 adopted in 2017 will soon be 
outdated, now is also the beginning of a new political 
cycle in Brussels with a European Commission that 
has set for itself a more ambitious geopolitical role. 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Josep Borrell has repeatedly emphasized that 
the EU’s ambition to project power at the global lev-
el and to devise credible approaches to geostrate-
gic actors such as China, Russia, or Turkey will on-
ly work if it is able to deal with its neighborhood.3 In 
this context, we are now at a new political juncture 
for the EU and its eastern neighbors to reset their 
partnership.
Under current circumstances, however, the EaP pol-
icy is hostage to internal and external challenges for 
the EU. Since the start of the new European Com-
mission’s mandate, the new policy has been prepared 
under a tight time schedule and below the politi-
cal radar, having been overshadowed by the debate 
about enlargement and other external relations is-
sues. The process, as a result, lacks sufficient trans-
parency outside of Brussels. Most member states, 
moreover, have neither the time nor the capacity 
available to formulate a novel vision that would set 
new goals and deliverables for the next EaP policy. 
Expectations of a full revamp before the June summit 
are therefore low despite the region’s strategic im-
portance for the EU. Most likely, the summit will set 
the tone for a new conversation on what comes next 
for the EaP, opening up the opportunity for Germa-
ny during its EU presidency in the second half of this 
year to contribute to the refining of the guiding pri-
orities for the EU’s eastern policy.  
A strong EU commitment at the June summit is 
needed, however, as EaP countries are undergo-
ing new political instability or stand at junctures 
where citizens’ aspirations toward a European fu-
ture are daily put to the test. Georgia is preparing 
for parliamentary elections in autumn whose pro-
cesses and results experts expect will be contested. 
Ukraine has been punished by Russia since 2014 for 
its choice of the European geopolitical vector. Mol-
dova is struggling with the influence of strong vested 
interests that impede its reform progress and dem-
ocratic transformation. Armenia is in the middle of 
difficult systemic changes in which EU support can 
make the difference between the country backslid-
ing or progressing on the promises of its Velvet Rev-
olution. For nearly all the EaP countries Russia and 
Turkey put their reform path under pressure or offer 
alternative role models for political elites. There is a 
growing competition in the region between the EU 
and Russia, Turkey, and China, where even the ‘most 
willing’ EaP countries are not certain anymore about 
the EU as the ‘only model’ for further development. 
This all takes place against the background of the EU 
being affected by internal weaknesses. At this critical 
juncture, a weak EU that is unable to make a credible 
statement of its intentions towards the region and its 
interests there can significantly weaken political and 
social forces that are still fighting endemic corrup-
tion and vested interests to secure a democratic fu-
ture of their countries.
1 European Council, “European Council Conclusions on the MFF, Climate Change, Disinformation and Hybrid Threats, External Relations, Enlargement 
and the European Semester, 20 June 2019,” June 20, 2019 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/20/european-council-
conclusions-20-june-2019/> (accessed February 21, 2020). 
 
2 European Commission, „President von der Leyen’s Mission Letter to Olivér Várhelyi,” November 7, 2019 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_oliver_varhelyi.pdf> (accessed February 
21, 2020). 
 
3 Jacopo Barigazzi, “Borrell Urges EU to Be Foreign Policy Player, Not the Playground,” Politico, September 12, 2019 <https://www.politico.eu/article/
on-foreign-policy-josep-borrell-urges-eu-to-be-a-player-not-the-playground-balkans/> (accessed March 9, 2020).
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1. A TIGHT DEADLINE
The new European Commission under the leader-
ship of its Directorate-General for European Neigh-
bourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG 
NEAR) and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) have only few weeks left to propose, consult 
around, and finalize a new Eastern Partnership poli-
cy as well as have it endorsed by the European Coun-
cil ahead of the June summit. In December and Janu-
ary, DG NEAR and the EEAS evaluated the outcomes 
of the structured consultation process on the future 
of the EaP that the European Commission conduct-
ed in the second half of 2019 at the request of the Eu-
ropean Council. They then presented the elements of 
the new policy at the Council working group (COEST). 
The next step is for the European Commission to re-
lease the draft new EaP policy at the end of March. It 
will then be presented to member states for endorse-
ment at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in April 
or May. The EaP countries also have to be consulted 
so that they are on board before the summit (see Fig-
ure 1). So far it remains unclear what role High Repre-
sentative Borrell will play in this policy process.
While a parallel informal consultation process with 
EU capitals continues, the time for negotiations and 
forming a sound, lasting consensus around the fu-
ture EaP policy has been almost exhausted. The tight 
timeframe significantly reduces the space for policy 
discussions on matters that could define the credi-
bility of the EU’s commitment in the region. It is up 
to DG NEAR to look for consensus on a policy that 
is still divisive among member states while it care-
fully navigates between their different priorities and 
sensitivities. 
FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF POLICY MAKING RELATED TO THE EASTERN 
PARTNERSHIP IN THE RUN-UP TO THE JUNE SUMMIT
OCT 31  
2019 MAR 18 
2020FEB 17  
2020
END OF 
JAN 2020
MAR 30 
2020FEB 20 
2020
The structured 
consultation 
process on the 
future of the 
Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) ends
DG NEAR to 
release the Joint 
Communication 
(planned date)
COEST discusses the ele-
ments of the new strategy 
and the summary of the 
structured consultation 
process 
DG NEAR and EEAS 
draft the new EaP policy 
and circulate it for inter-
nal institutional review 
AFET plena-
ry session for 
the adoption 
of its recom-
mendation on 
the Eastern 
Partnership 
(planned date)
The European Parliament’s 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (AFET) exchanges 
views on the EaP ahead 
of the adoption of the 
Recommendation to the 
Council, the Commission, 
and the High Represen-
tative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy on the Eastern 
Partnership
Tabling amendments by 
February 26, 2020
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2. AN UPDATE RATHER 
THAN AN UPGRADE
The current framework of the 20 Deliverables for 
2020, which was adopted at the previous Eastern 
Partnership summit in 2017, is coming to its endpoint 
with implementation mostly lagging (see Figure 2). 
This could be either upgraded (significant deepening 
or extension of goals and deliverables, with the EU 
formulating a novel vision for engagement) or updat-
ed (revision of the deliverables under a new, slight-
ly modified package). All the evidence to date sug-
gest the new EaP policy that will be put for adoption 
at the June summit will only be an update on the ex-
isting one rather than an upgrade. Three factors are 
required for an upgrade: consensus among member 
states, political leadership and prioritization of this 
policy dossier in Brussels, and significant progress by 
EaP countries in domestic reforms. At the moment, 
none of these three factors are sufficiently strong. 
As explained below, the EU’s divisions over how to 
engage with the neighborhood, the internal and ex-
ternal challenges that pushed the EaP down the EU’s 
list of priorities, and the lack of consolidated prog-
ress on key democratic reforms in the EaP countries 
all make an update of the EaP policy rather than an 
upgrade the most likely outcome.
2.1. The EU is Disunited
The EU and its member states currently face deep 
internal and external challenges that trump their ca-
pacity to act not only globally, but also in the eastern 
neighborhood. The most divisive issues vision-wise 
when it comes to upgrading the Eastern Partnership 
are the policy’s end-goal (that is, there is no consen-
sus on further eastern enlargement) and the Rus-
sia factor. A strong consensus on both is needed for 
the EU to be able to formulate a vision for its eastern 
neighborhood. Since the EU shifted its borders fur-
ther to the east, these issues have always been on the 
table, but member states have not reached a com-
mon position on them so far. 
More recently, both issues have become even more 
divisive in the context of President Emmanuel Ma-
cron’s initiatives to overhaul the EU accession process 
and to pursue a policy of outreach to Russia. His veto 
in October 2019 on opening accession talks with Al-
bania and North Macedonia was a reminder that the 
member states, rather than the EU institutions, are 
in the driver’s seat when it comes to enlargement. 
EARLY  
APR 2020
APR 28 
2020
APR/MAY 
2020
APR 22 
2020
MAY 11 
2020
JUN 18 
2020
First debate 
in COREPER 
II to discuss 
the draft 
Summit  
Declaration
Senior official 
meeting to gather 
feedback on the 
Joint Communica-
tion from member 
states and eastern 
partners in the EU-
27+EaP6 format
Joint Communi-
cation presented 
to member states 
for endorsement 
at the meeting of 
the Foreign Af-
fairs Council
Foreign Affairs 
Committee adopts 
the Council’s con-
clusions on EaP (to 
fix the EU’s position 
prior to the EaP 
ministerial meeting)
Informal 
EU27-EaP 
ministerial 
meeting Official en-
dorsement 
of the Joint 
Communi-
cation and 
EaP Summit 
Declaration 
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This has been reinforced by the European Commis-
sion’s proposed new methodology for the accession 
process, which was published in February.4 The pro-
posal comes, to an extent, in response to France’s de-
mands by providing a stronger political role to mem-
ber states.5 It offers them also to be involved more 
systematically in monitoring and reviewing the ac-
cession process. More broadly, there is little appetite 
for further enlargement and no consensus on wheth-
er providing a membership perspective, however dis-
tant, for the ‘most willing’ states of the EaP is a credi-
ble promise that could be made this year. 
EU member states also differ in their views on how 
to deal with Russia when it comes to their com-
mon neighborhood, as it was also the case in 2009 
when the EaP policy was established. The region 
has now become much more contested, in particu-
lar after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start 
of the armed conflict in the Donbas region of east-
ern Ukraine since 2014. Russia’s assertiveness in the 
region, its hybrid warfare against the West, and its 
clear signals about not tolerating further expan-
sion of the EU and NATO to the east have achieved 
the desired effect in many European capitals, where 
there is a strong hesitation about any kind of con-
frontation with Moscow as well as a fatigue with the 
status quo in EU-Russia relations. Moreover, Macron 
advocates resetting Europe’s relations with Russia in 
its quest for strategic autonomy and a new Europe-
an security architecture.6 At the same, in the United 
Kingdom the EU has now lost one of it most critical 
members towards Russia. The EU needs to clarify its 
common position vis-à-vis Russia, regardless of the 
EaP, so as not to undermine its aspiration to become 
a geopolitical power, but this is unlikely to happen 
before the EaP summit in June. Macron’s wish for 
rapprochement with Russia and the criticism this has 
drawn from many member states suggests more di-
vision than unity around the Russia question in the 
months to come. 
FIGURE 2: 20 DELIVERABLES FOR 2020 – PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN 2018
MODERATE 
PROGRESS
Source: The Eastern Partnership 20 Deliverables for 2020: State of Play  in 2018  
<https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/eap10> (accessed March 11, 2020)
CROSS CUTTING ECONOMY GOVERNANCE CONNECTIVITY SOCIETY
COMPLETEDON  
TRACK
4 European Commission, „A More Credible, Dynamic, Predictable and Political EU Accession Process – Commission Lays Out Its Proposals,” February 5, 2020 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_181> (accessed February 21, 2020) 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Speech of the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy,” February 7, 
2020 <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/news-about-defence-and-security/
article/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-emmanuel-macron-on-the-defense-and> (accessed February 21, 2020).
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2.2. The EaP is not an EU Geopolitical Priority
Lack of unity on how to drive forward relations with 
the Eastern Partnership countries confirms the deep 
differences in how member states perceive the EU’s 
borders and relations with neighboring powers. It 
leaves the EU, as a result, without political leadership 
and fragmented commitment towards the eastern 
neighborhood among other competing challenges. 
The EaP is not a priority for the EU and its mem-
ber states currently, despite the rhetoric in Brus-
sels. During a visit to Ukraine in February, Commis-
sioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Varhelyi 
said: ‘This Commission is a geopolitical Commission 
and geopolitical priorities cannot be credibly repre-
sented globally if we cannot do it effectively in our 
neighborhood.’7 Yet, amid other priorities for the 
EU, the EaP is low on the new European Commis-
sion’s agenda. Brexit and its repercussions, the ne-
gotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Frame-
work, improving defense and security coordination, 
the difficult relations with the United States as a re-
sult of President Donald Trump’s protectionist poli-
cies, and China’s growing influence – to name only a 
few – all rank above the EaP among EU’s priorities. 
Looking for consensus on an eastern policy that di-
vides more than it unites the member states is not 
what the EU currently needs. In parallel, there is a 
lack of leadership by Germany on this issue that will 
last at least until the country’s next elections due to 
domestic political constraints. Germany was initially 
expected to hold the EaP summit during its coming 
EU presidency, but it chose to prioritize other port-
folios such as hosting the EU-China and the EU-Afri-
ca summits. As a result, the EaP summit was passed 
to Croatia, which will host it just at the end of its EU 
presidency. This lack of leadership and prioritization 
greatly reduces the likelihood that a novel vision for 
the EaP will be formulated and agreed upon within 
the remaining timeframe.
2.3. Political Instability and Lagging Fundamentals 
in the EaP Countries
The Eastern Partnership countries are not in a good 
shape and cannot contribute to providing an impe-
tus for the EU to prioritize the partnership. Due to 
its own internal and external pressures, the region 
has not become a place of stability and prosperity, 
despite some significant but fragile transformations. 
The three EaP countries that would like to see an up-
grade of their partnership with the EU this June – 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – are experiencing 
increased political instability that jeopardizes the 
speed or quality of their domestic reforms. 
Ukraine’s domestic reform agenda has been over-
shadowed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s efforts 
to end the fighting in Donbas. This has made him ac-
cept concessions that are difficult for Ukrainian so-
ciety, such as agreeing to the Steinmeier formu-
la last October or releasing controversial figures in 
the prisoner exchanges with Russia. As a result, this 
deepens the existing polarization in the country and 
diminishes Zelenskyi’s popular support. The latter 
development has led to a government reshuffle on 
March 4 that experts predict it will diminish the pace 
and depth of key reforms in Ukraine.8 
Moldova experienced much political turbulence last 
year and is set ahead for further challenges. After the 
short-lived reformist government led by Prime Min-
ister Maia Sandu, the new government in place since 
last November seemingly works on the old princi-
ples of clientelism and patronage. It has issued state-
ments that it would continue the difficult reform 
agenda that was set by the previous government, but 
has not showed so far any signs of doing so.9  
Georgia has also faced serious challenges when it 
comes to democracy, good governance, and rule of 
law in the last few years.10 In particular, since last 
summer protests have erupted over dissatisfaction 
with how the ruling elites deal with Russia and the 
slowing down of domestic reforms. These keep soci-
ety polarized ahead of this year’s parliamentary elec-
tions, when the support and legitimacy of the ruling 
Georgian Dream party will be tested.
As for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, the situation 
there does not provide enough reason or motivation 
7 European Commission, „Remarks by Commissioner Várhelyi at a Press Conference with Prime Minister of Ukraine, Oleksiy Honcharuk,” February 11, 2020 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/varhelyi/announcements/remarks-commissioner-varhelyi-press-conference-prime-minister-
ukraine-oleksiy-honcharuk_en> (accessed February 21, 2020). 
 
8 Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Shake-Up Throws Future of Reforms Into Doubt,” Financial Times, March 8, 2020  
<https://www.ft.com/content/75583754-5fab-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4> (accessed March 9, 2020). 
 
9 Dominik Istrate, “The First 100 Days of Ion Chicu: Pressure Mounts on Moldova to Deliver Reforms,” Emerging Europe, February 26, 2020 
<https://emerging-europe.com/news/the-first-100-days-of-ion-chicu-pressure-mounts-on-moldova-to-deliver-reforms/> (accessed March 9, 2020). 
 
10 Freedom House, „Freedom in the World 2019 Georgia,” 2020 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2019> (accessed February 21, 2020).
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for the EU to prioritize the EaP. The challenges of pro-
tracted transition processes, such as entrenched vest-
ed interests and weak institutions, and an aggressive 
Russia that has deepened the security deficit in the re-
gion through use of force, hybrid warfare, and disinfor-
mation have made it difficult for the EaP states to make 
any sustainable breakthroughs in the last decade. 
3. THE EAP’S STRATEGIC 
IMPORTANCE
Despite the EU’s short timeframe for developing the 
new Eastern Partnership policy, the lack of political 
leadership and commitment, and the diverging views 
on the future of the EaP, the eastern neighborhood re-
mains of strategic importance and is worth prioritizing.
In the context of increasing multipolarity and geo-
political competition, its eastern neighbors are nat-
ural allies for the EU. Leaving them as a buffer zone 
between Russia and the EU, with no clarity on their 
membership perspective, will alienate their citizens 
at a time when the EU is still striving for building a 
ring of friends while Russia attempts to reassert it-
self as a global power by violating the internation-
al order on the EU’s doorstep. Moreover, leaving the 
EaP countries as a buffer zone is no panacea for the 
EU’s lack of a coherent and coordinated policy to-
wards Russia, and it will not eliminate the risk of a 
conflict with Russia in the future. 
In the last decade, the EU has invested a lot of efforts 
in the EaP countries and this has produced tangible 
long-term results. Modernizing societies, stronger civil 
society groups that act as watchdogs to keep govern-
ments accountable, and better functioning, more di-
versified market economies are all the result of EU’s 
transformative power in the region. It is only a matter 
of time before generational change and political con-
juncture lead to changing governance patterns as well. 
The EU needs functioning rather than hybrid states 
in its eastern neighborhood for its own security and 
stability. As an aspiring geopolitical power, it needs to 
see itself as a long-term player in the region, with in-
vestments that do not necessarily yield results imme-
diately. The EU needs to assess its efforts in the EaP 
countries through the lens of state-building and sus-
tainability. Citizens in the EaP countries perceive 
themselves to be European. They strive to achieve 
European living standards despite the challenges of 
transition and democratization. The EU is their pole 
of attraction, not Russia. By treating the region as 
its privileged zone of influence Russia pushes these 
countries away in search of alternatives that would 
strengthen their threatened statehood and sovereign-
ty. The EU and the EaP countries face similar challeng-
es to a certain degree, such as demographic decline, 
populism, or hybrid threats, cybercrime, and disinfor-
mation. These need to be solved together to enhance 
the EU’s credibility, reputation, and reliability, which 
are currently at stake across its entire neighborhood.
 
4. PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE EAP
The European Commission has received submis-
sions on the future of the Eastern Partnership from 
25 member states, all the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries, EU institutions, international organizations, 
and civil society stakeholders. It received nearly 200 
written submissions through the online platform of 
the structured consultation process alone. It also got 
feedback through consultation events, joint position 
papers, and reports from bodies in the current EaP 
architecture. The common and differing positions on 
key objectives and priorities for cooperation among 
the member states and the EaP countries are ana-
lyzed below. This shows the potential areas of dis-
agreement that might arise ahead of the summit or 
be swept under the carpet.
4.1. The EU Member States 
Based on the tangible benefits already delivered for 
citizens of the Eastern Partnership countries – such 
as visa-free regimes and enhanced trade opportu-
nities – there is a wide consensus among member 
states that the EaP is an appropriate policy frame-
work to continue collaboration. While some call for 
restructuring and reorganizing the procedures under 
the EaP umbrella, member states broadly agree that 
the next set of objectives needs to build upon rath-
er than replace the 20 Deliverables for 2020 and that 
new, additional structures are not needed.
As a result of the structured consultation process, 
supporting sustainable economic development is 
likely to be a key priority for further collaboration. 
This includes strengthening the investment and 
business climate; supporting growth and infrastruc-
ture development; providing assistance to small and 
medium-size enterprises; investing in young people’s 
skills, education, and economic potential; and em-
powering regional and local actors at a larger scale.
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There is also broad agreement on other equal-
ly important priorities such as the need to contin-
ue strengthening the fundamentals of good gover-
nance and the rule of law, to further enhance efforts 
in strategic communication by the EU, and to contin-
ue building people-to-people contacts and strength-
ening societal resilience. Enhanced cooperation on 
climate and environmental actions and policies is an-
other strongly favored goal, which clearly reflects 
the priorities of the new European Commission.
In parallel, there is strong agreement on the tools 
that the EU should employ. It should make better use 
of smart conditionality by employing the principles 
of “more for more” and “less for less.” It should also 
better monitor progress on the 20 Deliverables and 
the implementation of reforms related to Association 
Agreement (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements (DCFTAs). 
Member states disagree upon the degree of engage-
ment with EaP countries on defense and security is-
sues, as well as the balance between inclusiveness 
and differentiation within the EaP framework. 
For a few member states, such as France, defense and 
security clearly does not fall within the scope of the 
EaP. There is concern that any collaboration in this 
field, including on preventing cyber and hybrid threats, 
would work against the framework’s non-confronta-
tional approach and be counterproductive. For oth-
ers, such as Sweden and Poland, strengthening secu-
rity cooperation with EaP countries represents a key 
component for the next partnership policy to succeed. 
It would help develop a sustainable security environ-
ment for these countries and make them more resil-
ient. Germany speaks with multiple domestic voices 
on whether security should be a priority for the fu-
ture EaP policy. Those who call for more security co-
operation are not steering the political narrative, how-
ever, and Germany is among the member states that 
are hesitant about more joint efforts in this field. Last-
ly, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU makes 
the likelihood of upgrading security cooperation with-
in the EaP framework even slimmer.    
For a few member states it is important to send a 
strong message that engagement with the EaP coun-
tries has no geopolitical aims. It is an inclusive part-
nership offer to all six states based on individual 
preferences and ambitions. Any further differenti-
ation among them beyond the already existing dif-
ferences (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have signed 
AAs/DCFTAs) should be avoided so as not to give 
countries reasons to believe that the EaP is a ‘wait-
ing room’ for EU membership. For other member 
states, such as the Visegrad countries, the EaP has 
to remain a policy for EU integration for those states 
that aspire to one day become EU members, and are 
ready to implement the reforms that would trans-
form them into consolidated democracies and func-
tional market economies. These member states do 
not perceive a multi-speed EaP a risk but rather as 
an open door for targeted sectoral integration in key 
areas of common interest such as trade, transport, 
digitalization, or environment, to keep EaP states in-
terested in this multilateral framework and commit-
ted to achieving the milestones that each has agreed 
to. For Germany EaP engagement needs to remain 
inclusive, but it also needs to go beyond that by of-
fering new possibilities of cooperation (including in 
areas such as education, environment, digitalization, 
and connectivity) for those states that are close to 
full implementation of their AA/DCFTAs and aspire 
to closer cooperation via tailored individual offers. 
There is also disagreement among member states re-
garding the depth of sectoral cooperation and inte-
gration, which is in line with the lack of consensus 
on the end goal of the EaP policy.
Summarizing the perspectives above, it is clear that 
there are strong limitations to member states agree-
ing upon any novelties in the next EaP strategy. First, 
expectations of major changes among them are low. 
The existing structure of platforms and deliverables 
will most probably be preserved with an additional 
strong focus on climate and environmental action as 
a reflection of the new European Commission’s pri-
orities. At the same time, the current focus on build-
ing strong economies, institutions, and societies is 
likely to be preserved. 
Because of the limited time before the June summit 
and the low appetite for debate on sensitive issues, 
the European Commission and the EEAS are likely to 
follow a strategy of anticipating potential concerns 
of those member states that are against any securi-
ty cooperation by not including controversial pro-
posals on security and defense in the new framework 
they will propose. Considering, however, that a se-
curity dimension is key to the sustainability of re-
gional stability, the European Commission is likely 
to search for a smart EaP framework and a careful-
ly tailored narrative to scale up the new policy while 
at the same time avoid a potential conflict over ex-
plicit security engagement. This could equally mean 
no concerted security cooperation under the EaP 
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framework. For any member states and EaP coun-
tries that are willing to engage more on specific se-
curity issues, this will have to happen bilaterally or in 
‘coalitions of the willing’. 
Due to the limited time and leadership, it is also like-
ly that the EaP policy proposed at the June summit 
will include a timeframe no longer than a few years 
as well as be only the start of discussions on the next 
EaP objectives. There is also very limited time to 
specify refined measurement indicators for the im-
plementation of the future EaP priorities; therefore 
the indicators’ definition will most probably be left 
for only after the summit. With its EU presidency, 
Germany could be expected by other member states 
to play an increased role in this regard. 
Lastly, while there is no membership perspective in 
sight for the three associated countries in the near 
future, the jury is still out on whether the new poli-
cy will embed further differentiation for them. Under 
such uncertainty up until the finish line, ‘coalitions 
of the willing’ such as the Visegrad group can have a 
critical role to play in advocating for more differenti-
ation in the context of lack of clear leadership on this 
policy unlike in 2009 when Poland and Sweden as-
sumed strong advocacy roles. 
   
4.2. The EaP Countries
While the six Eastern Partnership countries have in-
dividually contributed to the structured consulta-
tion process, the three associated countries (Geor-
gia, Moldova, and Ukraine) have also issued two joint 
statements on the future of the Eastern Partnership 
in recent months. The December 2019 statement de-
lineates their expectation for differentiation among 
the EaP countries. The three countries strongly con-
veyed their expectation that the EU will come up 
with a ‘long-term, strategic, forward-looking agenda 
with political objectives and new benchmarks for the 
Partnership that will open the way for building ev-
er closer relations.’11 They also expect new ambitious 
targets, more broadly, such as gradual integration in-
to the Single Market and the establishment of a com-
mon economic space. They call for further sectoral 
integration in the areas of energy, transport, digita-
lization, customs cooperation, trade facilitation, and 
justice and home affairs. 
The associated countries call strongly for the EU to 
increase its engagement in peaceful conflict resolu-
tion by strengthening its presence in the conflict-af-
fected areas – an aspect of security cooperation that 
is unlikely to appeal to several member states. All 
three are also interested in enhanced cooperation 
with the EU and its member states on cyber secu-
rity and countering hybrid threats, as well as coun-
tering disinformation and propaganda. Unexpectedly 
perhaps, even Azerbaijan and Belarus have expressed 
interest in collaborating with the EU on soft secu-
rity matters, including migration management and 
border and human security. This reinforces the ar-
gument that the EU should expand security cooper-
ation with the EaP states.   
The EaP countries have expressed a much more mod-
est interest in an enhanced climate and environ-
ment agenda than the member states. Considering 
that there are member states that strongly advocate a 
‘green agenda’ in line with the priorities of the new Eu-
ropean Commission, a clash over the extent of ‘green 
action’ on the next EaP agenda is likely unavoidable. 
 
The EaP countries seem to have priorities in mind 
that clearly converge with those of the member 
states. There is most convergence on the need to 
support economic development as a means to build 
stronger states and societies. This requires signifi-
cant resources, however, which is first a matter for 
further negotiation among the member states. There 
is least convergence on the need and extent of dif-
ferentiation, security cooperation, and environment 
and climate action. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
The year 2020 is an opportunity for the EU to prove in 
its eastern neighborhood that it is a global actor able 
and willing to project power and influence. Though it 
has not put time on its side by scheduling the Eastern 
Partnership summit within half a year of the start of a 
new European Commission that has more immediate 
priorities to deal with, the EU needs to take the EaP to 
the next level to safeguard its strategic interests and to 
elevate the union itself to the next level. 
11 3 DCTFAs, “Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the Future of Eastern Partnership,” 
December 5, 2019  
<https://3dcftas.eu/library/documents/joint-statement-by-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-georgia,-the-republic-of-moldova-and-ukraine-on-the-
future-of-eastern-partnership> (accessed March 9, 2020).
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On the substance of the EaP policy
1.  The June summit will most likely not see bold  proposals for the EU’s new EaP policy – not least because the EU lacks a common vision 
for how to engage with the region. Considering the 
strategic importance of the region for the EU’s secu-
rity, the investments that it has made through its EaP 
policy, and the strong ties that it has developed with 
those segments of societies in the region that work 
to build more sustainable and resilient democracies, 
the EU’s renewed set of long-term priorities for the 
eastern neighborhood needs to ensure the main-
tenance of EU’s transformative power there, which 
would enable the EaP states to tackle the challenges 
ahead. This could be done by:
a. Refocusing policy in the EaP countries on demo- 
cratization by concentrating on institution-building, 
with the public administration, judiciary, prosecution 
services, and anti-corruption as key areas for reform.
 
b. Proposing a sustainable and credible new frame-
work for long-term engagement with the EaP coun-
tries that suits their different levels of demand and 
aspirations for closer ties with the EU.
2.  To sustain the political impetus for difficult  domestic transformation processes, the EU should pursue a differentiated approach to-
wards the ‘most willing’ of the EaP countries (Geor-
gia, Moldova, Ukraine) by deepening existing rela-
tions via targeted sectoral cooperation in more key 
areas of common interest. Strengthened coopera-
tion and subsequent gradual full integration into the 
Single Market need to be conditional on reforms and 
significant progress in good governance, rule of law, 
and the fight against corruption. The principle of 
conditionality should not be sacrificed for economic 
benefits for individual countries as this will damage 
the credibility and reputation of the EU among the 
reformist segments of EaP societies.
3.  While the EU acknowledges the strategic  importance of the eastern neighborhood, it is not prepared for the comprehensive 
security challenges it faces in the region and its 
member states are divided on how to approach 
them. The EU should include a smart security coop-
eration approach in the new framework to strength-
en the capacity of EaP states to counteract hybrid 
threats, disinformation and propaganda. More, en-
hanced security and defense cooperation should be 
pursued bilaterally or by groups of states willing to 
further assist EaP states in decreasing their vulnera-
bility to security and cyber threats.
4.  Under Germany’s EU presidency, a new set  of instruments should be adopted to ensure the effective implementation and monitor-
ing of progress on AA/DCFTA reforms, as well as 
broader reform-assessment mechanisms for the next 
set of EaP deliverables. In this regard:
a. The EU needs to back up the next EaP framework 
with an adequate level of financing that should be 
sustainably embedded in the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2021-2027. Regardless of whether the 
European Neighborhood Instrument is preserved or 
not as a separate tool in the new financial architec-
ture, the resources to be allotted should match the 
newly set priorities.
b. Germany should use the opportunity of its EU 
presidency to call a ministerial meeting between the 
member states and the EaP countries to adopt an in-
clusive operationalization mechanism of the new pri-
orities that will be adopted at the June summit.
On the policymaking process
5.  It is key that the next EaP policy represents  a credible partnership commitment for both the EU and the EaP states. To do that, the 
EU needs to have a policymaking with regard to the 
EaP process that is transparent, includes civil society 
organizations, and provides enough time for mean-
ingful political dialogue and consensus building. This 
will help increase trust among the diverse parties 
that are part in this process. 
6.  The rapprochement with Russia that is  increasingly sought by France and other member states as well as the time pressure 
of the June summit deadline should not take place 
at the expense of strengthening the resilience of the 
EaP states and the EU’s strategic interests in this re-
gion. Germany should use the EU presidency to pri-
oritize the EaP by bringing more substance to the 
core of the framework that will be adopted at the 
June summit.
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